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2.	PEIPING	COMMENTS	ON	TROOP	MOVES	IN	BURMA
	BORDER	AREA					

25X1A

Peiping's first statement about the alleged Communist military intrusion in the disputed Sino-Burmese border area is clearly an attempt to minimize damage to the Communist peace cam-

paign without retreating from the unyielding position the Chinese have taken on the Sino-Burmese border question.

In a broadcast of 3 August, the authoritative "Observer" of People's Daily dismisses newspaper reports that Chinese troops have occupied Burmese territory as "groundless" and "absurd." "The American propaganda machine" is accused of exploiting the situation in an attempt to draw Burma into SEATO and create tension between Burma and Communist China.

Peiping tacitly admits the presence of some Chinese troops in the disputed territory along undemarcated portions of the Sino-Burmese border but claims that their mission is to "preserve the status quo" until boundary questions can be settled by diplomatic means through "peaceful consultations and negotiations."

Since 1954, Communist China has brusquely parried repeated Burmese efforts to obtain a negotiated settlement. Peiping's statement suggests the Communists plan to keep their new military outposts in place along the disputed border in order to strengthen Chinese territorial claims.

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3. YUGOSLAVS ACCEPT LARGE SOVIET-EAST GERMAN ALUMINUM DEVELOPMENT LOAN

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	Under an agreement signed in Moscow
	and announced on 3 August, the USSR
	and East Germany have granted Yugo-
slavia an immed	diate long term credit of 700,000,000 rubles
(\$175,000,000) f	or the development of a Yugoslav aluminum
	ng necessary hydroelectric power facilities
_ , ,	is to finance construction of facilities with
	ction of 50,000 tons. A future credit for

doubling this capacity has been promised.

East Germany and the USSR are each to give an equal share of the present credit, but part of the Soviet share is apparently to be in the form of wheat deliveries. The Yugoslavs will sell the wheat internally to meet the construction costs of the project. All the credits are to be repaid by aluminum exports, which are to start not later than 1961.

Comment

Since mid-June, Belgrade has insisted it was looking for Western financing for both power and aluminum production facilities. As recently as 14 July it publicly reiterated its desire for West European foreign exchange credits and American wheat on credit for local currency needs.

Previous Soviet bloc credits accepted by Yugoslavia totaled \$289,000,000. This newest credit will help satisfy Soviet aluminum needs and Yugoslav wheat needs.

The USSR may have to help finance at least part of East Germany's share of the credit. This credit may be considered by the Yugoslavs as payment of the East German war reparations. The Yugoslavs may have informally promised diplomatic recognition of East Germany in the near future as a quid pro quo, despite the fact that Tito told the West Germans only three weeks ago that his "present" policy was not to do so.

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25X1A		E PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS AMERI AL ASSISTANCE	CAN
	stated that ties, and of India could gram must in Nepal, to States could must "reluminister a	The Nepalese prime minister i the acting director of the Amer mission in Katmandu on 30 July cabinet's strong feeling that a principle industrial development in Nepal priority for fiscal year 1957. The principle industrial equipment and technical their industrial equipment and technical not furnish. Indicating that the development in the prime minister clearly implied that the prime minister clearly implied that all not provide the necessary materials, actantly accept Communist assistance. Iso implied that the United States should that efforts to minimize American influence.	rican ICA y of his program of l must have me minister gn commodi- aid which pment pro- is to survive if the United Katmandu The prime l aid Nepal
	India is je	Nepal recently agreed to estable matic relations with Communis and has received offers of aid from bot alous of its dominant position in Nepal agr a material increase in American aid	st China and h countries. nd would be
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6. BRITISH U	URGING NEUTRALITY FOR LAOS	
25X1A	•	
premier S statement would deci on the "fiv	The British Foreign Office iterated to the American emin London its belief that Lactinevitably become neutral, a that the time is ripe to solicit from Lactinevitable in Lactine and ineutrality. This solare Lactine neutrality, a foreign policity principles of Pandit Nehru," and the Lactine independence against any threa	bassy s will and has otian policy tatement y based intention
by the clos	The British evidently have king these views on Souvanna time. The measure of their success is seness with which the premier has followed in his current negotiations with the I	Phouma indicated owed the
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7. SOVIET MID-YEAR PLAN FULFILLMENT

25X1A	two percengoods were specific confavor of confideries with conting Labor produstry (eignal half year, ing period This perfortion difficulties	The report on plan fulfillment for first half of 1956 shows that the economy is off to a good start of Sixth Five-Year Plan. Industrict duction maintained the 12 percest of the last three years and exceeded that. Targets for principal producer and commodities suggest a slight yet noticeable insumer goods. Increases in sown acress of machinery and fertilizer to agriculturating good weather, presage a good harved ductivity increased to the planned degree that percent) and construction (10 percent although 10 percent greater than in the confusion of 1955, represented only 86 percent of rmance is attributable primarily to chroulties and secondarily to shortfalls in the ent, and, if not corrected, may complicate ent, and, if not corrected, may complicate entered the secondarily to shortfalls in the ent, and, if not corrected, may complicate entered the secondarily to shortfalls in the ent, and, if not corrected, may complicate entered the secondarily to shortfalls in the ent, and, if not corrected, may complicate entered the secondarily to shortfalls in the entered the secondarily to short	e Soviet on the cal pro- ent annual de plan by consumer oduction of de shift in dege and in re, coupled est this fall. e in both in-). s during the correspond- the plan. onic construc- e production
	of Five-Ye	ear Plan production targets.	25X1A
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